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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff - Respondent, 
- VS -
GERALD OAKLEY HUGG INS, 
Defendant - Appellant. 
Brief of Respondent 
Case No. 
10545 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Gerald Oakley Huggins, appeals 
from his conviction for the crime of taking indecent 
liberties with a child under the age of 14 without 
the intent to commit rape, prohibited by Section 76-
7-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried on information in the Dis-
trict Court of VJ eber County, the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, judge. The case was tried to a jury and 
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appellant was found guilty and s-:;ntenced to the 'n-
determinate term of imprisonment provided by !aw. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the convictior.. shoulc 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following state-
ment of facts, since those set forth in the appellant': 
brief are incomplete and totally erroneous m man-1 
respects: 
The appellant and his wife and small daughter 
(2Y2) resided next to Mr. and Mrs. Eva Nelson, who 
had two children, Tina Marie, age 6, and Sharen. 
age 8 (Tr. 15). 
On July 2, 1965, Mrs. Nelson fixed an outdoor 
supper. Appellant was present, as was a small girl, 
Lynn Garthia Walton, age 10 (Tr. 87). According to 
Tina Marie, she went to the appellant's house to use 
his bathroom, because her father was using the one 
in her home (Tr. 59). She testified that the appellant 
was by a bed as she went to the bathroom and then 
the following occurred (Tr. 60): 
"Q Where was he? 
A He was on, he was by the bed. 
Q What did he do, what did he say? 
A He said "get on the bed, don't go out." 
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Q And did he say any more to you? 
A After he said pull down your pants, and I 
dc1d, and he put his private into mine. 
Q When you say he put his private into yours, 
tell the jury what he did. 
A He put his pee pee into mine. 
0 How long was it there? 
A Until Sharon came in. 
Q And after that, what did you do? 
A I pulled up my pants and then he got a knife 
and then he said if you tell anybody, I'll kill you. 
Q Did that scare you? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you ever see the knife again? 
A No. 
Q What kind of knife was it? 
A It was a broken handle, just a little part of it. 
0 And what did his private or pee pee look 
like? 
A It was straight." 
This was generally in accord with a statement 
she gave to the police about ten days later. The state-
ment was offered and received by stipulation of ap-
pellant. m -\lJ );1e appepant in his statement of facts says that the girls testified that wh mer~ Y put his hands on their private parts. This is not found any-
ere m their testimony and is completely unsupported by the record. 
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Sharon Nelson, age 8, testified as to an occur. 
ranee on the same day. She recalled the day as b~ 
ing July 2, 1965. She testified (Tr. 45): 
"A I was playing. I went in to get Debbie's toy 
cloy and he said "Put the toy dog down." 
Q Then what did he do? 
A He put me on the bed and put his private 
in mine. 
Q Vlhathappenedthen? 
A Then after he got through, he went in the 
kitchen and got a knife and threatened me with 
it and told me if I told anybody he would kill me. 
Q Did this make you afraid? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you tell anybody? 
A No. 
Q Have you ever told anybody? 
A Just last, I think the 10th of July. 
Q Who did you tell? 
A My mother and father. " 
Mrs. Eva Nelson, mother of the two children, 
testified that as a result of a conversation with the 
children on July 10, 1965, she had them taken to a 
family doctor and subsequently, to the police (Tr. 
' h d' tri"t at-18). The trial court refused to allow t e 15 ~ 
tomey to obtain the specific conversation from Mrs. 
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Nelson (Tr. 18). However, on cross-examination, the 
~ppellant's counsel imm9diately went into the con-
versation between Mrs. Nelson and her children 
v.·h1ch occurred on July 10 (Tr. 22). On cross-exam-
ir.ation, appellant's counsel brought out that during 
6 bath the girls had asked about playing nasty (Tr. 
22). She said that Tina had told about the incident, 
but that the older one, Sharon, at first denied It. 
Counsel brought out Tina's statement to her mother 
th:i.t Huggins had assaulted her (Tr. 25). 
After appellant's counsel had elicited the state-
ment from Mrs. Nelson, the court advised the ap-
pellant's counsel, upon inquiry from the prosecu-
tion, that he considered the appellant's counsel to 
have opened the matter for the whole conversation. 
Appellant's counsel further brought out the girls' 
stat2ments to the police and stipulated to have their 
written statements introduced into evidence (Tr. 30, 
33, 55). 
On redirect examination of Mrs. Nelson, the 
prosecution, after appellant opened the matter on 
cross-examination, asked for the conversation be-
tween herself and her children which occurred as 
folhws (Tr. 36): 
"Mrs. Nelson on the occasion of July 10 when 
you were bathing these children would you tell us 
the conversation which gave rise to your discussion 
on the word nasty. 
A. The children, Sharon asked me, she said 
"Mother, can I tell you something," and I said what. 
She said "You know when we were eating outside 
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Thursday night, over to Gerry's," and I said "yes' 
and she said 'Lynn told me that her Uncle G . . erry was 
playmg nasty with her and she asked me _ ." 
The court then observed in the face of an objecti . on. 
"The objection is overruled. The matter has been 
opened up. The conversation is to be used onlv in 
judging the creditability of the witnesses her~ or, 
trial, that appear at the trial only. All right." 
Mrs. Nelson then said with reference te> her ch1 1 
dren' s inquiry as to what nasty meant (Tr. 36): 
"I told her that it had two meanings. It could 
be something you ate that didn't taste right. That 
would be nasty, or it was when a man or a boy or 
anybody took little girl's panties down and put their's 
in their's and that would be playing nasty, and then 
my youngest one, I was getting them dried at the 
time and my youngest one started crying and backed 
herself in the corner of my bathroom and stood there 
screaming. I asked her what is wrong. She says 
"Mommy that is what he done to me." I got her 
calmed down enough that I asked her, I said now 
tell mommy just what happened, and she did." 
Immediately on re-cross-examination, appellant's 
counsel expanded on Mrs. Nelson's reiteration of 
her child's complaint (Tr. 37): 
"Q How old is this girl that said that is what 
Gerry had done to her? 
A Lynn is 10 now. The one that told Sharon. 
Q Was it Sharon Lynn? 
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A No, Lynn is the one that told Sharon that her 
Uncle Gerry had played nasty with her and 
Sharon is the one that told me. Sharon's age, 
she is my daughter." 
Not until after appellant's counsel had specifical-
ly expanded the issue did appellant (in the absence 
of a jury) move for a mistrial (Tr. 40). It was denied 
and the court observed that it was interwoven with 
the conversation appellant had opened up (Tr. 40). 
Mrs. Nelson acknowledged that on one occa-
sion a year before, her young son Mike (13 at time 
of trial) had put his hands on the private parts of her 
children. She immediately took him to a doctor, who 
said it was normal in the growth process of chil-
dren (Tr. 27). The doctor, Dr. McEntire, corroborated 
Mrs. Nelson's testimony that there had only been 
one complaint (Tr. 86). 
Mrs. Nelson further testified after the conver-
sation with her children that she examined the va-
ginal area of her children. Tina Marie (age 6) was 
red in the area and had a tear in her vagina in the 
"weeping membrane." (Tr. 20). Sharon was also red 
in the area (Tr. 20). Dr. McEntire, who examined the 
girls the same day, noted a laceration a "quarter of 
an inch long" on Tina Marie (Tr. 82). His examina-
tion of Sharon indicated that she was normal (Tr. 82). 
Ramona Snow, as well as Mrs. Nelson, testified 
that the children were afraid of appellant after July 
2nd (Tr. 21, 74). 
The court allowed Lynn Garthia Walton, a child 
age 10, to testify that on the same day the other chil-
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dren were assaulted that she was assaulted in thti 
same manner by the appellant (Tr. 91). The covt 
did so on the theory that it demonstrated the rr.id 
of the accused (Tr. 41 ). 
The appellant, of course, denied his invol%-
ment (Tr. 108). Included in his statement was an as-
sertion that before trial he was examined by phy2:-
cians at the State Hospital and found normal (Tr. 12l'i. 
The above facts, admittedly taken in favor o'. 
the prosecution in the sense that the defense ca2e. 
including appellant's wife's testimony, has beer. 
lightly treated, support the jury's verdict and pn-
vide the foundation for appellant's conviction. 
Other facts relevant to appellant's single poin1 
on appeal will be discussed in the argument por-
tion of the respondent's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITT-
ING EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT'S OTHER MISCON-
DUCT, WHICH WAS A PART OF THE SAME PAT· 
TERN, SINCE IT WAS RELEVANT FOR PURPOSES 
OTHER THAN TO SHOW APPELLANT'S BAD CHAR-
ACTER, AND APPELLANT FAILED TO PROPERLY 
PROTECT THE RECORD AT TRIAL. 
The appellant as his only issue on appeal con-
tends that the trial court committed error in allo"·N-
ing the receipt of evidence of the additional assault 
by appellant on Lynn Garthia Walton. No claim is 
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properly made that the evidence was otherwise im-
properly admitted. 
At the outset, it should be noted that the first 
reieren.:e to Lynn Garthia Walton of relevance to 
this appeal came after the court had refused to al-
bw the prosecution to go into the conversation be-
tween Mrs. Nelson and her two children. Immediate-
i'" after the prosecution's examination of Mrs. Nel-
s~n, the appellant, on cross-examination, opened the 
matter up by inquiring as to the specifics of the con-
versation. The tri:=i.l court expressly advised appel-
lant that he had opened the door. Thereafter, with-
out objection, the prosecutor requested that Mrs. 
Nelson give the full conversation. She then dis-
c1osed how the matter of the assault on her daugh-
ters had been discovered when Tina, during her 
b:i.th. asked what nasty meant because Lynn Garthia 
Wal ton had told her appellant played nasty with 
her. 
Two bases rebut any contention of error. First, 
appellant made no objection to the receipt of con-
'Tersation until after the prosecution's question was 
clearly stated, and until after Mrs. Nelson's answer. 
The objection, therefore, came too late. In Abbott, 
Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., § 350 it is observed: 
"The proper time to object to the introduction 
of evidence is when it becomes apparent that error 
will be committed by receiving evidence which is not 
admissible, as when the evidence is offered or when 
a question is asked which is itself improper or calls 
for an improper answer. 
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An objection to a question comes too late after 
the question has been answered." (Emphasis added) 
Consequently, appellant, having failed to time-
ly object to the testimony, may not now contend it 
was hearsay and should not have been received. 
79 A.L.R.2d 890; Child v. Child, 8 Utah2d 261, 332 
P.2d 981 (1958); White v. Newman, 10 Utah2d 62, 348 
P.2d 343 (1960). 
Second, the evidence was directly within the 
scope of examination opened up by appellant on 
cross-examination; consequently, the prosecution 
had every right to extract the full conversation. Mc-
Cormick, Evidence, pp. 60-61, 131-133 (1954). As foe 
court observed the matter was so "interwoven" with 
the conversation as to be a necessary part of it, and 
appellant, having opened the door, may not now 
complain. McCormick, supra, p. 132, observes: 
"Most of the courts seem to say generally that 
'one who induces a trial court to let down the bars 
to a field of inquiry that is not competent or relevant 
to the issues cannot complain if his adversary is also 
allowed to avail himself of the opening'." 
Additionally, if the testimony of Lynn Garthia 
Walton was, itself, admissible, there could be no 
error from the admission of the reference to the pos· 
sible molest of her in the conversation with Tina. 
Before considering the question of the admissi-
bility of the Walton girl's testimony, it is important 
that a statement made in appellant's brief be correct-
ed. The appellant's brief, p. 8, states that the district 
11 
attorney had asked the mother of Lynn Garthia Wal-
ton to sign a complaint against appellant the morn-
ing of the trial and that this was deliberate timing 
by the prosecution. The record in this regard shows 
that the district attorney had nothing to do with the 
issuance of the complaint against the appellant in 
1.ne Walton case. The complaint was issued by the 
countv attorney (Tr. 106), who is separate and distinct 
from the district attorney. Consequently, any ref-
erence to the intent of the prosecutor is inappropri-
ate. 
The general limitation on the proof of other 
c:Limes is set out in McCormick, Evidence, p. 327 
(1954): 
"The rule is that the prosecution may not intro-
duce evidence of other criminal acts of the accused 
unless the evidence is substantially relevant for some 
other purpose than to show a probability that he 
committed the crime on trial because he is a man of 
criminal character." 
In State v. Scott. 111 Utah 9, 175 P.2d 1016 (1947), 
Justice Wolfe explained that evidence of other 
crimes is admissible, unless it is only relevant to 
prove the accused's general propensity to commit 
crime. The court observed: 
"The basic rule of admissibility of evidence is 
that all evidence having probative value-that is, 
that tends to prove an issue, is admissible. In coun-
tries where the civil law prevails that is clearly recog-
nized. But in the common law there were developed 
certain exceptions to that basic rule, for example, 
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the hearsay rule, which made certain evidenc 
though relevant and material, incompetent. That w:; 
because of the danger of prejudice to the parti· 
against whom it was offered who would have no chan~e 
to cross-examine the source, or the probative value 
of the evidence offered was small as compared to the 
great prejudicial affect it might have. So-called 'e1: 
ceptions to the hearsay rule' are really not exceptions 
to the basic rule of admissibility, but are in realitv 
limitations on the hearsay exception. As to the ad-
missibility of evidence of prior offenses some court< 
(ours included as will be hereafter shown) have seem· 
ingly lost sight of the fact that the basic rule of ad· 
missibility of evidence was that all evidence having 
probative value was admissible, and instead appear 
to consider as the basic rule what is really an except· 
ion to the overarching rule of admissibility; that is. 
the rule is announced as one where evidence of other 
crimes than that charged against the accused is in· 
admissible. Such courts then set up exceptions to that 
rule which render certain evidence of other crimes ad· 
missible. 
The better analysis is that evidence is admissible 
not because it comes under an exception to the rule 
of exclusion but that the rule of exclusion is suffic· 
iently narrow that it does not apply to such evidence 
and the evidence is therefore admissible under t~e 
basic rule that all evidence having probative value is 
admissible. 
As stated above the American Law Institute in 
its Model Code of Evidence approaches the mat~er 
from this latter direction. As to the rule regardmg 
the admissibility of other offenses, it proposes as 
follows: 
t character 'Subject to Rule 306 [rule as 0 . d 8 . h on comm1tte evidence]. evidence t at a pers 
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crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion is 
inadmissible as tending to prove that he com-
mitted a crime or civil wrong on other occasion, 
if, but only if, the evidence is relevant solely as 
tending to prove his disposition to commit such 
a crime or civil wrong or to commit crimes or 
civil wrongs generally.' Model Code of Evidence, 
1942, page 196, Rule 311. 
The rule thus stated limits the rule which ex-
cludes evidence of other offenses rather than sets up 
a broad rule of exclusion subject, however, to many 
exceptions. 
In this court's opinions the rule has been ap-
proached from both directions. Mr. Justice Wade in 
his opinion in State v. Nemier, 106 Utah 307, 148 
P.2d 327, discusses the problem and relying on the 
case of People v. Coughlin, 13 Utah 58, 44 P. 94, con-
siders the rule to be that in criminal cases evidence 
of other crimes is admissible unless it is relevant sole-
ly to show propensity to commit crime. This is the 
rule as proposed by the American Law Institute. 
On the other hand, our latest decision involv-
ing the question was State v. Peterson, 110 Utah 413, 
174 P. 2d 843, which, citing State v. Kappas, 100 
Utah 274, 114 P.2d 205, announces the rule to be a 
broad rule of exclusion subject to many exceptions. 
That is the way the rule is stated in most of the Utah 
cases where it has been involved.State v. Pollock, 102 
Utah 587, 129 P.2d 554; State v. Kappas, 100 Utah 
274, 114 P.2d 205; State v. Anderton, 81 Utah 320, 
17 P.2d 917; State v. McGowan, 66 Utah 223, 241 
P. 314; State v. Bowen, 43 Utah 111, 134 P. 623. Ex-
ceptions which are mentioned in the cited cases are: 
if the evidence tends to show intent or motive, if it in-
dicates the offense was not due to accident or mis-
take, to show a general plan, to show 'all relative 
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facts and circumstances which tend to establish con-
stitutive elements of the crime' of which the defend-
ant is charged. The number and limit of the except. 
ions have not been set-perhaps they are so numer-
ous and so broad that the general rule is cut awa1 
until it, in effect, excludes only evidence which is rei. 
evant solely to show the evil disposition of the de· 
fendant. If such is the extent of the exceptions the 
rule as announced in these cases is the same in effect 
as the rule espoused by the American Law Institute 
in its Model Code of Evidence. 
We think that the better statement of the rule 
is that suggested in Mr. Wade's opinion in State v. 
Nemier, supra, and which is Rule 311 of the Model 
Code of Evidence quoted above. We, therefore, adopt 
the rule as thus stated to be the law of this state." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the general rule in Utah is that evidence 
of other crimes is admissible, unless the sole basis 
for the admission of the evidence would be proved 
a general criminal disposition. This being the rule 
the question to be answered on this appeal is simply 
did the evidence of appellant's molestation of Lynri 
Garthia Walton have any relevance to the charge of 
molesting the Nelson girls, other than to show h:s 
criminal propensity? The state submits that it did 
and that the evidence was admissible. 
With respect to the rule allowing proof of oth~; 
criminal conduct, McCormick, Evidence, P· 32: 
notes: 
h' h "There are numerous other purposes for w ic 
evidence of other criminal acts may be offered: and 
when so offered, the rule of exclusion is simply map-
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plicable. Some of these purposes are listed below, but 
warning must be given that the list is not complete 
for the range of relevancy outside the ban is almost 
infinite; and further, the purposes are not mutually 
exclusive, for a particular line of proof may fall with-
in several of them." 
McCormick, supra, pp 328-329, notes that there are 
numerous bases for the receipt of evidence of other 
:::rimes. It may be to establish motive, to show malice, 
deliberation, ill will, or specific intent, to prove 
identity, to show the conduct was not inadvertent, 
accidental, unintentional or without guilty knowl-
sdge, to show a scheme, plan, or conspiracy, to 
show passion of propensity for illicit sexual relations 
with reference to particular types of conduct. Thus, 
there are many reasons why the evidence received 
oy the trial court in this case was admissible. 
In State v. Scott, supra, this court ruled that in 
a prosecution for obtaining money by means of coin-
matching confidence games, evidence of similar 
acts was admissible to show that the defendants 
·"'1ere acquainted with each other and to show a gen-
eral scheme of operation and the participants in-
volved. 
The cases cited in appellant's brief in support of 
reversal of the appellant's conviction are inappropo 
to the present fact situation. 
In the case of State v. Kazda, 14 U.2d 266, 382 
P.2d 407 0963), there was no offer by the prosecution 
of evidence of other crimes committed by the ac-
cused to prove any particular element other than a 
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criminal propensity. Quite to the contrary, the io: 
of that case disclosed an F.B.I. agent, who was~: 
amined by the prosecution in laying foundation'.: 
the admissibility of the confession of the appeil:~!·, 
went into details relating to interrogation of the a: 
pellant concerning other serious and fiendish crl:nc 
throughout the United States that had no real r: 
erence to the defendant. Obviously, this case bea: 
no relationship to the facts of the instant appeal. 
By the s:::me token, the case of State v. Dickso!l, 
12 U.2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961), is equally in:ipplic~· 
ble. In that case, the court indicated that the prose· 
cution in offering evidence of other crimes under 
the theory of modus operendi had not shown sum 
cient identity of circumstances. Even so, the cou' 
indicated that the questioning probably would 10' 
have been prejudicial, 12 U.2d 11, had the prosec~' 
tion not gone into a subsequent incident in Fo-~ 
Worth, Texas, unrelated to the incident for which he 
was charged, where there was no indication of th~ 
extent of the involvement of the defendant, exce~; 
that his brother was wounded by a gunshot and~.: 
attempted to help him. The court indicated: 
"There was no justification for the questioning 
as to the incident in Texas on the theory of modus 
operendi. Practically, the only similarity shown is 
that two men were involved in both incidents." 
Consequently, it is apparent that the Dickson ca.se 
bears no relationship to the framework cf the in-
stant case. 
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The testimony of Lynn Garthia Walton, as to 
the assault by the defendant on her, was apparent-
ly part of the same res gestae of assaults which were 
foe subject of the instant prosecution. The assault 
occurred the same day, approximately the same 
time, and under the same set of circumstances. 
Finally, the appellant contends that the case of 
State v. Winget, 6 Utah2d. 243, 310 P.2d 738 (1957), 
is controlling. In that case, the appellant was 
charged with rape of his eight-year old daughter. 
The trial court allowed into evidence testimony that 
a 17-year old stepdaughter of the accused had been 
raped on four different occasions by the accused. 
However, those occasions bore no particular rela-
tionship to the incident for which the accused was 
being tried. In that case, the court stated, with ref-
erence to the time of the four incidents: 
"Defendant raped her while he was married to 
the witness mother--one eight and seven years be-
fore and twice, four years before, the first such inc-
ident occurring, so she said when she was eight or 
nine years old and the last when she was twelve." 
At the time of the witness's testimony, she was 17 
years of age, and there had been no recurrence. 
Further, there was no showing that the acts relating 
to her were in any way related to the rape on the 
eight-year old daughter, which was the crime for 
which the accused was being tried. The State, there-
fore, submits that the Winget case is good author-
ity for the particular facts under which it was de-
cided, but not relevant to the case now before the 
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court, where the Walton girl was assaulted at ths 
same time and under the same and similar circum-
stances as the two girls for which the appellant wu.s 
being charged. 
Justice Wade noted the difference in his con-
curring opinion, where he stated: 
"Evidence that a lustful man raped his step-
daughter several years ago tends to show his moral 
degenerated character and disposition to rape his own 
daughter, but does not seem to show that two dif-
ferent offenses were a part of a general plan design, 
or system." 
Thus, the Winget case bears no particular relation-
ship to the instant case. 
In State v. Williams, 36 Utah 273, 103 Pac. 250 
(1909), the appellant was alleged to have raped a 
female child under 13 years of age. The facts actual-
ly disclose that there were two girls which the ap-
pellant assaulted at approximately the same time. 
The prosecution asked the prosecutrix whether the 
appellant had said anything about having sexual re-
lations with any other person. The prosecutrix then 
indicated: 
"There were some girls from the first ward that 
came up quite a bit and he would do the same thing 
to them that he done to [the girl who was assaulted 
with the prosecutrix] and I." 
The court indicated that it felt that the admission of 
the statement of the appellant was error. The evi-
dence disclosed that the other little girls had visited 
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his home over a period of six to eight years; conse-
quently, there was no identity to the particular of-
fense, and the court felt that bringing in testimony 
of an assault upon other girls not at the same time 
or under the same general conditions as occurred 
to the prosecutrix was prejudicial error. However, it 
should be noted that the court did not feel that the 
evidence of the assault upon the prosecutrix's 
companion, which occurred at the same time as the 
assault on her, was inadmissible, even though only 
one girl was named as the victim in the information. 
Ccmsequently, the Williams case stands not for re-
·:ersal in the instant situation, but for affirmance, 
since the factual situation regarding the assault on 
the Walton girl in this case is very similar to that in-
volved in the Williams case, as respects the com-
po.nion of the prosecutrix. 
Many cases from this court and other courts, 
under similar circumstances, have sustained the ir:-
troduction of such evidence. 
In People v. Brooks, 133 Cal.App.2d 210, 283 P.2d 
748 0955), the California court was faced with a sit-
uation similar to that in the instant case. Defendant 
had been charged with sodomy on a seven-year old 
girl. The prosecution offered evidence that the de-
fendant had exposed himself to the prosecutrix and 
other individuals on a different occasion. The court 
affirmed the conviction, finding that it was corrobo-
rative in nature and not prejudicial. The court 
seemed to be impressed that the incident bore a 
substantial connection to the incident for which the 
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appellant was on trial. Consequently, the remote-
ness issue was not before the court, and the evi-
dence was properly considered by the jury. 
In State v. McDaniel. 80 Ariz. 381, 298 P.2d 795 
(1956), the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed a con-
viction of the defendant for the crime of fellatio. The 
court ruled that there was no error in admitting the 
testimony as to whether defendant committeci a. i 
crime on other prior occasions. In doing so, the comt 
laid down some interesting rules applicable to the 
admission of evidence of similar crimes of a sexual 
nature. First, the court found the evidence admis-
sible to show the manner or mode of seduction by 
the defendant. The court said that such evidence: 
"would be subject to the limitation of relevant 
nearness in time and would not apply to mere crim· 
inal tendencies in general as distinguished from spe-
cific sexual inclinations." 
Applying the test of the Arizona Supreme Court tc 
the facts of the instant case, it is obvious that the ac-
tions of the appellant with reference to the Walton 
girl, being actually a part of a continuous process 
and demonstrating a plan, scheme or design to grati-
fy his sexual desires, as well as showing the manner 
and mode of his actions, rendered the evidence ad-
missible. 
The California court has recognized that con-
tinuous sexual responses are admissible, where the 
defendant is charged with a single sexual act. Peo· 
ple v. Ford. 81 Cal.App.2d 580, 184 P.2d 524. 
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In State v. V./inget, supra, Justice Henriod indi-
cated that the "'lilliams case, supra, appeared to fol-
low the majority rule. This is so with reference to 
the specific holding in the Williams case, but not 
nece~sa:-ily so as a general proposition, for as noted 
in the annotation 167 A.LR. 574, referred to in the 
:Jmt's opinion: 
"In most jurisdictions, it is recognized that in 
prosecutions for statutory rape or rape of a female 
under the age of consent or otherwise unable to con-
sent, evidence is admissible which tends to show prior 
offenses at the same time committed by the defend-
ant with a prosecuting witness, such evidence being 
admitted in corroboration of the offense charged to 
prove an identity and not to prove a separate of-
fense." 
In State v. Hilberg, 22 Utah 27, 61 Pac. 215 (1900), 
and in State v. Neil, 23 Utah 541, 65 Pac. 494 (1901), 
this court has held that evidence of improper famil-
iarity between the defendant and a prosecutrix 
prior to the commission of the offense for which the 
defendant is charged is admissible. 
A similar result has been reached recently in 
State v. Hadley, 65 Utah 109, 234 Pac. 940 (1925) and 
State v. Jameson, 103 Utah 129, 134 P.2d 173 (1943). 
In State v. Sanchez, 11 Utah2d 429, 361 P.2d 17 4 
(1961), the appellant was convicted of statutory rape. 
On appeal, it was contended that the testimony of 
the Prosecutrix that while she was in the bedroom 
with the defendant, defendant's companions were in 
another room taking turns committing a similar of-
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fense with her sister, was prejudicial was rejec!E: 
by the court. On appeal, it was contended that !h, 
evidence shouldn't have been admitted, becauw 
cast the defendant and his companions in a b:r 
light and because it revealed the commission:· 
other offenses. The court, relying on State v. Shod. 
ley. 29 Utah 25. 80 Pac. 865 (1905), rejected the cor 
tention that the evidence was not admissible, statin~ 
"Her knowledge of the facts concerning thes~ 
men coming to the house and their activities at thr 
time arose directly out of her immediate involve· 
ment in the whole set of circumstances attendant 
upon the commission of the offense and on which the 
defendant and his criminal conduct was also involved. 
Neither the fact that this evidence cast the defendant 
and his comrades in a bad light, nor that it reveal' 
the commission of other offenses, makes it necessal')· 
to exclude evidence which is material to show all rel· 
evant facts surrounding the comission of the offense 
charged." 
Thus, to some extent, the court was recognizing rr. 
the Sanchez case that where the evidence of another 
similar sexual assault occurs as part of the genera! 
res qestae of the offense charged, it may be used ir. 
evidence against the defendant. 
A case directly in point is State v. Cooper, 111 
Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764 (1949), where the defendan! 
was charged and convicted of the crime of indecen 
assault on a child under the age of 14 years, under 
the same statute that the appellant in the instant case 
was convicted of violating. The defendant was 
charged in the Cooper case with having indecent!:' 
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assaulted a child 11 years old. A witness testified 
that subsequent to the charge against the appellant, 
he had pulled a knife on him in a threatening man-
ner to induce him to stay off the witness stand. He 
was cross-examined by defense counsel with a view 
towards showing that it was really not a threat, but 
that appellant had pulled the knife as part of a nerv-
out habit. On redirect-examination, the witness was 
asked concerning whether the defendant had 
''nlayed nasty" with the witness. Defense counsel 
objected. The prosecuting attorney stated that the 
evidence was offered for the purpose of rebutting 
the inferences raised by cross-examination of the 
witnesses, that the witness had no grounds or bases 
to fear the defendant. The trial judge admitted the 
testimony and this court affirmed on appeal. The ap-
pellant had argued that the admissibility of the other 
sexual molest was merely the proof of other crimes 
and, therefore, not admissible. This court, noting its 
decisions in State v. Scott, supra, and State v. Nemier, 
106 Utah 307, 148 P.2d 327 (1944), ruled that the evi-
dence was properly received. The court rejected an 
argument that the admission of the evidence would 
"tend to inflame the passions and prejudices of the 
Jurors.'· The court ruled that the trial court had ap-
parently weighed the conflicting considerations and 
determined that the evidence should be received. 
Consequently, it is submitted that the Cooper 
case is direct authority for the admission of the al-
most contemporaneous assault of a similar nature ~y appellant upon the Walton girl. This evidence 
id not show the bad character or the propensity of 
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the appellant towards crime in general, but rather, 
showed a direct scheme and plan to satisfy his sex-
ual lust. It demonstrated a design upon young girls 
a sexual abberation which would be indicative of a. ' 
pattern of sexual conduct. Consequently, the evi-
dence was directly relevant to demonstrate the de-
sign the appellant had on the day in question tr: 
satisfy his sexual desires and his tendencies toward~ 
achieving gratification in an abnormal manner. The 
facts in this case clearly bring the appeal within th" 
framework of the decisions of this court in Cooper 
and Scott. 
Decisions from other courts have also seemeo 
to sustain the position of the Utah Supreme Court 
and in People v. Haltman, 10 Ill.2d 74, 139 N.E.2d 286 
(1956), a conviction in a prosecution for taking in-
decent liberties with a female child was upheld anJ 
the court ruled that defendant could not claim that 
evidence of other offenses committed by defendant 
with children was inadmissible. 
In Ash v. State, 96 Ga.App. 359, 100 S.E.2d 149 
(1957), the defendant was charged and tried for the 
crime of child molestation. Evidence was received 
as to the acts of the defendant towards the sister of 
the victim, which occurred in the immediate vacinity 
of the act with which the defendant was charged 
and took place immediately preceding the same act 
The court ruled that this was, in effect, a continuing 
pattern of conduct by the defendant and that the 
trial court did not commit error in admitting the evi-
dence. 
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In Dyson v. United States, 97 Atl.2d 135, (D.C. 
1953), the court ruled that evidence of other homo-
sexual touchings and squeezings by the defendant 
:::ould be admitted in evidence as showing a par-
ticular emotional predisposition or pattern which 
vrould continue and which would tend to prove the 
crime charged. 
The cases really depend, to a large extent, net 
on any general rule of inclusion or exclusion, but as 
this court noted in State v. Scott, supra, upon wheth-
er there is some legitimate basis for receipt of the 
evidence other than to demonstrate the general 
tendency of the defendant for criminality. Anno. 77 
A.L.R.2d 841. Certainly, the evidence admitted as to 
the appellant's actions with the Walton girl would 
tend to show a sexual modus operandi and emotion-
al pattern of conduct in the appellant to satisfy his 
sexual 1 ust. See the discussion of the court in State 
v. Cooper, supra. 
The state of the law is noted in 8 Washington 
and Lee Law Review, 86 (1952), where the observa-
tion is made, with reference to the rule excluding 
proof of other crimes: 
"There is much authority that the general rule 
does not apply with its full effect in trials on sex 
crimes ***." 
The article also observes, with reference to courts 
allowing evidence to be admitted as to other acts of 
criminal misconduct: 
"Courts adopting this view place great emphasis 
on the mental attitude of the accused. It is reasoned 
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that criminals are motivated by an abnormal pattern 
of emotional maladjustments, and the evidence of 
prior sex crimes is declared to be admissible to show 
the bent of mind, the lustful disposition and the de-
generated nature of the defendant." 
In State v. Badders, 141 Kan. 683, 42 P.2d 93,1 
(1935), the Kansas Supreme Court allowed into evi-
dence proof of another sexual act of misconduct bv 
the appellant. In doing so, the court found that thi.:: 
tended to demonstrate a mental or emotional p3t-
tern indicative of the fact that the appellant corr-
mitted the crime. It evidenced a state of mind or 
mental condition of a sexual degenerate. 
It is submitted that the court could correctly de-
termine, in view of the authority above cited, tha.t 
the apparent interest of the appellant in the deviate 
sexual activity of assaulting small girls would justify 
showing that his actions on the Walton girl were 
part of a general pattern of conduct or sexual direc-
tion to satisfy his lustful desires. Since the Walton 
assault occurred at the same time and at the same 
place as the assault on the Nelson girls, it would ap-
pear to be part of a continuous act, and the coun 
would not have erred in receiving the evidence. 
Since the evidence of the assault on the Walton 
girl was, itself, admissible, the court's preliminary 
reference to the jury of the fact that appellant had 
been charged with the assault on the Walton gi;l 
was not prejudicial. See State v. Hadley, 65 Utah 109, 
234 Pac. 940 (1925), where the court held that a prior 
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inappropriate reference was cured by the over-
whelming evidence of the appellant's guilt. 
Further, it should be noted the appellant's 
counsel, subsequent to the court's instruction to the 
iury. which was, in effect, an instruction limiting the 
extent to which the jury could consider the evidence 
of the assault on the Walton girl, took it upon him-
se~f to call a witness on behalf of the defendant and 
wen'c into detail surrounding the circumstances of 
the additional charge imposed against the appellant 
for assaulting the Walton child. Under these circum-
stances, it is clear that the admission of the evidence 
of the assault on the Walton girl cured any conceiv-
able prejudice from the court's reference to the 
charges, and the appellant, having continued to 
open the door even wider and go into specific de-
tails and actions in the preparation and consumma-
tion of the charges, prevents any claim of error at 
th:s Juncture. McCormick, Evidence, § 57 (1954). 
Additionally, it is submitted that the instruction 
given by the court was wholly appropriate. First, the 
court expressly advised the jury that the appellant 
'Nas not on trial for assault against the Walton girl, 
blit indicated that it had a bearing only on the 
motive or nature of the crime committed as to wheth-
er it would be unusual for a person to be motivated 
to the commission of this particular crime. Such an 
\:i.struction was clearly in accord with the more mod-
ern view, recognizing that sexual abberations arise, 
1~ part, because of a pattern of emotional conduct. 
Tne appellant's attempt to distort the instruction 
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into a statement that the evidence could be used to 
prove the appellant's general disposition for crim-
inal misconduct or his particular proclivity to ge:-. 
eral criminal wrongdoing cannot be sustained. 
It is therefore submitted that based on the above 1 
authorities and the particular facts of this case, that 
the trial court did not commit error in receiving th8 
evidence of the commission of another similar sex-
ual assault close in time and place to the one with 
which the appellant was charged. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue raised on appeal in this case is or.e 
requiring delicate consideration. As general know!· 
edge in the field of human behavior increases, evi· 
dence of conduct of an individual may be directlv 
relevant to prove a likelihood of additional conduct 
because of established behavior patterns. Further, 
the law in the State of Utah seems to draw a distinc· ' 
tion between the admissibility of proof of other · 
criminal misconduct unrelated to the offense, both 
in time and nature, and that where the other crim· 
inal conduct shows a continuous pattern of behavior 
and is closely related in time and sequence to the 
crime for which the defendant is standing trial and 
which has a bearing upon the determination of guilt 
or innocence, other than to show a general pro· 
pensity for criminal misconduct. It is apparent that 
under the decision of this court in State v. Scott, 
supra, the trial court acted properly in receiving into 
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evidence the testimony of the assault on the Wal ten 
girl and the circumstances indicating the appellant's 
~nvolvement in that assault. 
There is no ba_sis for reversal. This court should 
aifirrn. 
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